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Past research has shown that minorities arguing in favor of the majority opinion within a given
population (i.e. the ‘Zeitgeist’) are more powerful sources of social influence than minorities
arguing against the normative population opinion (i.e. Clark & Maass, 1988a and b; Paicheler,
1977). We studied the Zeitgeist effect within the context of freely interacting groups discussing
the death penalty. In direct contrast to past research, minorities arguing against the death
penalty Zeitgeist were more powerful sources of social influence than those arguing in favor of
it. Analyses of conversation content and thought-listing data suggest that minorities arguing
against the death penalty may have been more influential because they were appealing to a
superordinate shared belief system within their respective groups.
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When Moscovici and his colleagues published
their classic experiment regarding minority
influence in 1969, the functionalist approach
was the prevailing paradigm utilized in the study
of social influence (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). The central assumption of the
functionalist approach was that social influence
is asymmetrical, or in other words, that majority

members were the source of social influence but
never the possible targets of minority influence
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(Festinger, 1950, 1954). Moscovici (1976) was
highly critical of this particular approach,
largely because it precluded the possibility of a
successful minority social movement. In
addition to his empirical work, Moscovici had
ample historical evidence supporting his argument that minorities were powerful sources of
influence who inspired innovative social
change.
After almost 30 years of research on minority
influence, the question is no longer whether or
not minorities are influential, but rather, under
what conditions opinion minorities are most
influential. Although this question has been
addressed in numerous empirical investigations
(see Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1984;
Nemeth, 1986; and Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette,
Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994 for excellent
reviews of this research), a particularly interesting line of research has involved comparing
numerical minorities arguing in favor of and
against the same attitudinal issue (Clark, 1988;
Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Maass, Clark, &
Haberkorn, 1982). A critical variable in these
studies seems to be whether the minority is
arguing for or against a position that is prevalent
in the general population (i.e. the ‘Zeitgeist’).
The majority of these studies have revealed
strong asymmetries in social influence patterns,
with minorities arguing in favor of the Zeitgeist
being more potent sources of social influence
than those arguing against ‘the spirit of the
times’. In two experimental investigations
Paicheler exposed participants to either a
minority source of influence arguing in favor of
women’s rights (pro-Zeitgeist) or against
women’s rights (anti-Zeitgeist). In each study
she found that the minority arguing in favor of
the Zeitgeist exerted more social influence than
the minority arguing against women’s rights
(Paicheler, 1976, 1977). Similarly, Clark and
Maass found consistent asymmetries in the
social influence patterns of minorities arguing
in favor of and against gay rights and abortion
(1988a, 1988b, 1990). Again, minorities arguing
in favor of the current ‘majority opinion’ in the
general population were more influential than
those who argued against the majority position.
It is important to note that in both the

Paicheler (1976, 1977) and Clark and Maass
(1988a, 1988b, 1990) studies the Zeitgeist was
operationally defined as the predominant or
majority opinion within a defined population
(i.e. majority opinion). The Zeitgeist may also
be construed as a minority trend in a population
whose strength of momentum suggests that it
will ultimately represent majority opinion. That
is, the former definition of the Zeitgeist represents that which is already accepted by the
majority and the latter definition of the Zeitgeist
represents that which will become majority
opinion. In order to use the ‘minority movement with sufficient strength of momentum’
definition of Zeitgeist, one would have to
predict in advance the success of a particular
minority movement. Given that it is historically
impossible to make precise a priori predictions
regarding the success of a given minority movement, it makes sense that empirical investigations of the Zeitgeist effect have relied
exclusively on the ‘current majority opinion’
definition of Zeitgeist.
Several explanations for the asymmetrical
social influence patterns in Zeitgeist studies
have been offered. Clark (1990) argued that
minority arguments in line with the Zeitgeist
may be perceived as more valid than arguments
that run counter to the spirit of the times
because of the implied social support for the
position being argued. In other words, for issues
where an objectively correct position cannot be
determined (as is the case with women’s rights,
gay rights, abortion, and the numerous other
judgmental issues used in the research showing
Zeitgeist effects) social support may be used to
gauge the validity of a given position. Clark
argued that a minority faction can demonstrate
social support for its position in one of two ways.
First, it may do so by arguing in favor of the
current Zeitgeist. Second, social support for the
minority position can be demonstrated through
the movement of majority members to the
minority position. The latter method was supported in Clark’s 1990 investigation that utilized
a condensed version of the play Twelve Angry
Men (Rose, 1954). In this experiment, participants were exposed to jury deliberation transcripts where a minority juror argued in favor of
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acquittal. Minority influence was greatly
enhanced when the transcript included the
depiction of several majority faction defectors.
The same experiment revealed that the minority’s ability to successfully refute majority
members’ arguments also greatly enhanced
minority influence potency. Clark (1990)
argued that his findings provided a framework
for understanding the asymmetry problem in
minority influence.
Clark’s explanation for the consistent asymmetries found in the minority influence literature is not without its critics. For example, Perez,
Papastamou, and Mugny (1995) asserted that
Clark’s explanation suggests that minority influence can be understood within the classic conformity/dependence framework and they
correctly argue that much of the minority influence literature is inconsistent with this notion
(see Clark, 1995 for a response to this criticism).
Conversely, Mugny and Perez (1991) suggest
that one of the many ways in which minorities
can be influential is when they link their arguments to a common normative principle that is
shared by both the majority and the minority.
This explanation, relative to Clark’s, broadens
considerably the conditions under which
minorities are likely to exert social influence in
that it is not necessary for the minority to argue
in favor of the position held by the majority of a
population on the specific issue at hand. That is,
minorities can validate their counternormative
position by linking their arguments to some
shared superordinate belief or value system. For
example, consistent with Mugny and Perez’s
reasoning, a persuasive message against the consumption of animal products (a minority position in the United States) would be more
influential when it pointed out how the consumption of animal products was incongruent
with a general respect for all living things than
when the superordinate socially shared belief
(respect for life) was not mentioned.
A conceptually similar principle applicable to
both minority and majority influence has been
put forth and empirically supported by Tindale
and his colleagues (Smith, Tindale, & Anderson, in press; Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins,
& Sheffey, 1996). A ‘shared representation’ is

any task or situation-relevant concept, norm,
perspective, or cognitive process that is shared
by most or all of the group members. The
presence of a shared representation results in
asymmetrical influence patterns favoring a particular decision alternative (Smith, Tindale, &
Steiner, 1998; Tindale, Sheffey, & Filkins, 1990;
Tindale, Filkins, Thomas, & Smith, 1993). That
is, both minorities and majorities favoring the
alternative consistent with the shared representation exert greater influence than factions
favoring alternatives inconsistent with the
shared representation. For example, the
‘reasonable doubt criterion’ operates as a
shared representation within the context of
jury deliberations. The large body of mock jury
research has revealed strong asymmetries in the
social influence patterns with those favoring
acquittal (which is consistent with the reasonable doubt criterion) being more influential
than those arguing in favor of conviction
(Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & Holt, 1977; Kerr
& MacCoun, 1985; Nemeth, 1977; Tindale,
Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990). Tindale
and his colleagues have found direct minority
influence on both intellective tasks (e.g. those
with a demonstrably correct response) and
judgmental tasks (e.g. those for which there is
not a demonstrably correct response) when a
shared representation is present and the minority’s arguments are consistent with the shared
belief/value system.
The literature on opinion deviance in groups
suggests that minority sources of influence are
more likely to be rejected, and therefore less
likely to be influential, when they impede group
locomotion (Levine, 1980). This effect is exacerbated when group members are highly interdependent (Berkowitz & Howard, 1959) and when
the minority is perceived as being responsible
for the group’s failure ( Jones & deCharms,
1957; Miller & Anderson, 1979). In a series of
studies Miller and his colleagues explored the
effects of several different group decision
making rules (e.g. majority, unanimity) on
group members’ acceptance of opinion deviates
(Miller & Anderson, 1979; Miller, Jackson,
Mueller, & Schersching, 1987). In each study
Miller found that minorities in unanimous
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decision making groups, because they could
easily impede group locomotion, were evaluated
much more unfavorably than minorities in
groups where members operated under a majority decision rule. This research suggests that
minorities may be evaluated more positively and
may be more likely to influence others when
they do not impede group goal attainment (see
also Smith, Tindale, & Dugoni, 1996). On the
other hand, it is unlikely that being perceived
negatively necessarily precludes the ability to
influence. For example, Nemeth (1977) found
more social influence in groups required to
reach unanimous as opposed to a majority supported verdicts in a jury decision making study.
In juries where a unanimous verdict was
required minority factions often prevailed, but
only when they were arguing in favor of acquittal. Nemeth’s work suggests that certain contexts (e.g. groups working under a unanimous
decision rule) may empower minority factions
to insist that their viewpoint be heard and that
the final group product reflects their position.
In addition, it suggests that the ease with which
a particular position is defended affects minority influence. As stated earlier, the ‘reasonable
doubt criterion’ makes the acquittal position
much easier to defend.
Although minority and majority influence
processes are always conceptualized as interactive, they are rarely studied together in the
context of freely interacting groups (but see
Smith et al., 1996; Tindale et al., 1990a). That
is, confederates typically play the role of minority sources of influence within a group, or
perhaps more commonly, individual subjects
are provided with bogus feedback from ostensible fellow minority participants. Even more surprisingly, very few empirical investigations of
the Zeitgeist effect have focused upon the
content of the minority’s arguments. Without
such analyses, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
assess the validity of any of the explanations for
the Zeitgeist effects found in the literature.
That is, in order to assess whether successful
minorities are appealing to a superordinate
belief system or a shared representation, one
must document the specific arguments put
forth by the minority.

Overview of the present study
In the present study we attempted to increase
the level of ecological validity beyond that typically found in studies exploring Zeitgeist effects
in minority influence. We did so by exploring
the social influence processes within freely interacting groups discussing the death penalty. We
chose this particular issue because both pilot
data collected at Grand Valley State University
and national opinion polls in the United States
indicate that there is a strong majority in favor
of capital punishment.1 There also happens to
be an overarching shared belief/value system
within our participant population that appears
to be relevant to the death penalty issue. The
majority of students at Grand Valley State University identify very strongly with the Christian
religion. If minorities arguing against the death
penalty use religion to justify their position,
majority members may perceive their arguments
as valid and thus highly influential. That is,
minority members could validate their counternormative position by making salient the group
members’ strongly shared Christian values and
identities. Therefore, in direct contrast to past
research, minorities arguing against the death
penalty Zeitgeist may be more influential than
those arguing in favor of it.
Roughly half of the groups in the present
study were required to reach consensus regarding their opinion on the death penalty.2 The
research on opinion deviance within groups suggests that minority members within consensus
seeking groups are more likely to be viewed
unfavorably relative to minority members in discussion contexts. If being perceived unfavorably
adversely affects the ability to influence, minority members in consensus seeking contexts are
expected to be less influential than minority
members in discussion contexts. On the other
hand, Nemeth’s (1977) work points to the
importance of context in predicting minority
influence potency. Minority members in consensus seeking contexts may be more influential
relative to those in discussion groups because
the group decision making norms in consensus
seeking groups encourage the thoughtful consideration of every person’s view. In addition,
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the anti-death penalty position may be easier to
defend if religious justification is used.

Method
Participants
Two hundred and twenty introductory psychology students participated as either individuals
(N = 35) or as members of five-person discussion
groups (N = 185, 37 groups). All participants
received course credit for their participation
and were randomly assigned to experimental
conditions.

Design
Five-person groups with both single and supported minorities were studied. More specifically, groups with single (N = 8 groups) and
supported (N = 13) minorities arguing against
the death penalty (against the Zeitgeist) were
compared to groups with single (N = 5 groups)
and supported (N = 11 groups) minorities
arguing in favor of the death penalty (proZeitgeist). Twenty groups were asked to reach
consensus(N = 13 supported minority groups
and N = 7 single minority groups) and 17 of the
groups simply discussed the issue without
making a collective judgment regarding the
death penalty (N = 11 supported minority
groups and N = 6 single minority groups). In
addition, several dependent measures designed
to assess discussion quality, group members’
perceptions of one another, and cognitive processes were collected.

Materials and procedures
The experiment was introduced to participants
as one that explored how people thought about
important social issues as individuals and as
members of discussion groups. Each group participant was seated around a large table and told
that she/he would take part in a group discussion that would be audiotaped. First, participants responded to a pretest comprised of two
questions regarding the death penalty. The first
question required the participants to respond
categorically (in favor/against) to the issue, and
the second question required them to respond
to a 21-point bipolar scale (ranging from 50 to

–50, in intervals of 5, with a mid-point of 0) indicating the degree to which they were in favor
of/against the death penalty.
After responding to the pretest measure, participants were asked to discuss the death penalty
with their fellow group members. Before leaving
the room the experimenter told the groups that
it was very important that every group member
participate in the discussion and to encourage
this, she/he suggested that the group begin its
conversation with each member stating her/his
position along with one of the reasons they held
their position. All group discussions were audiotaped in order to keep track of the thoughts
brought forth during discussion. Individuals
who were members of consensus seeking groups
were given a group decision sheet on which they
were asked to record their final group position
regarding the death penalty. Groups were
required to respond both to the dichotomous
question (in favor/against) and to the 21-point
bipolar scale. Although they were not informed
at the outset that they were operating under
time constraints, consensus seeking groups discussed the issue until a decision was reached or
25 minutes had passed. Each nonconsensus
seeking group was asked to discuss the issue
until the experimenter returned to the room. In
these groups consensus was not required or
requested. Each nonconsensus group was
matched to a consensus seeking group with
respect to discussion duration. At the end of the
discussion period the experimenter returned to
the room and informed the participants that the
group discussion part of the experiment was
over. Participants were then given the same attitude measure and asked to state once again their
position regarding the death penalty and to
respond to the 21-point bipolar scale.
At this point participants were asked to work
independently and to list all of their thoughts
regarding the death penalty. They were given
two sheets of paper each divided into two
columns labeled ‘arguments’ and ‘counterarguments’. They were asked to list every thought
that came to their mind. They were given 10
minutes to do so.
Finally, group members were asked to
respond to several questions designed to assess
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Table 1. Raw and relative frequencies of change in position for both minority and majority members (relative
frequencies are in parentheses)
Consensus
——————————————
Majority
Minority
Originally against death penalty
Originally in favor of death penalty

2
(6.7%)
1
(2.9%)

the quality of their discussion (e.g. ‘our discussion was very thorough’, ‘I learned new information about the death penalty today’, ‘it was
easy to defend my side of the argument’) and to
also evaluate each member of their group along
several dimensions (e.g. ‘this group member
seemed very intelligent’, ‘this group member
seems rigid in their opinion regarding the death
penalty’, ‘this group member made our discussion more stimulating’). Each question was
followed by a 9-point scale with ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ as the scale anchors. Upon completion of
this final task, group participants were debriefed
and thanked for their participation.
Individual participants only responded to the
death penalty attitude pretest and listed their
thoughts regarding the death penalty. They
were given 10 minutes to list their thoughts.
After doing so, they were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.

Results
Changes in dichotomous (in favor/against)
responses
Participants’ pretest and posttest responses to
the dichotomous question (in favor/against the
death penalty) were used to create a variable
that reflected whether or not the participant
had changed her/his position regarding the
death penalty during the course of the experiment. This variable was submitted to a 2 (minority member vs. majority member)  2
(consensus vs. discussion)  2 (against vs. in
favor of the death penalty) log-linear crossclassification analysis. Table 1 shows the raw and
relative frequencies of individuals who changed

3
(18.8%)
6
(40%)

Nonconsensus
——————–———————
Majority
Minority
1
(5.0%)
0

5
(26.3%)
0

their position during the course of the experimental session. The model provided an adequate fit of the observed data (p > .20) after all
three main effects and the consensus by position
and position by status (minority vs. majority)
two-way interactions were entered (2(1, N =
180) = 0.250, p = .88). Two effects were found to
influence the fit of the model. First, those who
were minority members within their group
changed their position more frequently (23%)
than those who were majority members within
their group (3%) (2(1, N = 180) = 16.76, p >
.01). There was also a significant consensus condition by death penalty position interaction
(2(1, N = 180) = 7.17, p < .01). In the consensus
condition, those who were against the death
penalty changed their position almost as frequently as those who were in favor of the death
penalty (10% and 14% respectively). In the nonconsensus condition there was a large difference
between the rate at which those who were
against the death penalty changed their position
(15%) and those who were in favor of the issue
(0).

Attitude change on the continuous variable
Mean pretest death penalty attitude scores for
majority and minority members within groups
are presented in Table 2. A 2 (member of a
group with a single vs. supported minority
member)  2 (majority vs. minority member) 
2 (consensus vs. nonconsensus seeking group)
 2 (participant in favor of vs. against the Zeitgeist) analysis of variance was performed on the
pretest death penalty attitude scores. There
were no significant main or interaction effects
across the 16 cells.
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Table 2. Mean pretest scores, standard deviations, and cell sizes for minority and majority members for each
condition within the experimental design
Consensus
Nonconsensus
—————————————— ————————————————–
Single
Supported
Single
Supported
minority
minority
minority
minority
Minority in favor of the Zeitgeist
Majority members

Minority members

Minority against the Zeitgeist
Majority members

Minority members

28.12
(11.67)
16
28.75
(16.52)
4

30.83
(11.91)
18
25.83
(14.89)
12

27.18
(12.24)
16
23.33
(7.63)
3

30.00
(12.46)
20
27.33
(14.49)
15

22.00
(14.18)
10
35.00
(25.98)
3

30.27
(15.85)
18
31.66
(11.74)
12

23.75
(6.94)
8
25.00
(17.19)
13

22.91
(11.76)
12
27.14
(12.86)
7

In order to assess attitude change in majority
members exposed to minorities arguing against
and in favor of the death penalty Zeitgeist,
change scores were computed for each individual. Change scores were computed differently for majority members in favor of and
against the death penalty because of the nature
of the bipolar scale used. For majority members
who were in favor of the death penalty (and used
the positive end of the scale)change scores were
computed by subtracting posttest attitude scores
from pretest attitude scores. For majority
members who were opposed to the death
penalty (and used the negative end of the scale)
change scores were computed by subtracting
pretest attitude scores from posttest attitude
scores. Thus, in all instances, negative attitude
change reflects movement toward the minority
position and positive attitude change reflects
movement away from the minority position. A 2
(minority in favor of/against the death penalty)
 2 (consensus/nonconsensus seeking group)
 2 (single vs. supported minority source of
influence) analysis of variance was performed
on the attitude change scores of the majority
members within groups. There was a main effect
for position taken by the minority (F(1,116) =

5.14, p = .02). Majority members who were
exposed to minorities arguing against the Zeitgeist changed more toward the minority position (M = –3.33) than did majority members
who were exposed to minorities arguing in favor
of the Zeitgeist (M = 1.66). There was no main
effect for consensus condition. There was a marginal main effect for single versus supported
minority condition (F(1,116) = 2.17, p = .14).
Majority members who were exposed to single
minorities changed less (M = 0.400) than those
exposed to supported minorities (M = –2.53).
There was a two-way interaction between position taken by the minority and consensus condition (F(1, 116) = 4.66, p < .05). Majority
members exposed to minorities arguing against
the death penalty in consensus seeking groups
shifted their opinions toward the minority position (M = –6.03), whereas majority members
exposed to minorities arguing in favor of the
death penalty became more extreme in their
anti-death penalty attitudes (M = 3.21). Majority
members in nonconsensus seeking groups
shifted very slightly toward the minority opinion
both when the minority was arguing against the
death penalty (M = –0.71) and when the minority was arguing in favor of the death penalty
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(M = –0.50). Finally, there was a marginally significant interaction between consensus condition and whether or not the majority member
was exposed to a single or supported minority
member (F(1,116) = 3.05, p = .08). Majority
members who were exposed to supported
minorities changed their position toward the
minority position in both the consensus (M =
–4.44) and the nonconsensus (M = –0.322) conditions. Majority members exposed to single
minorities changed in the direction of the
minority position only in the nonconsensus condition (M = –1.04) and changed away from the
minority position in the consensus condition
(M = 1.73).
Similar analyses were carried out on the attitude change data for minority members within
groups. There were no significant main effects
or interactions for any of the variables. Given the
very small cell sizes, it is unlikely that we had the
power necessary to detect differences if they
existed.

who were greater in number, could use religion
to argue against the pro-death penalty minority.
There was a main effect for consensus condition
(F(1,33) = 6.97 p = .01), with those who were
asked to reach consensus mentioning religion
more frequently (M = 4.00) than those who were
asked to discuss the issue (M = 1.37). The
relationship between attitude change and the
number of religious statements made during
discussion was assessed. A significant correlation
between majority members’ attitude change and
the mention of religion was found when the
minority argued against the death penalty
(r(67) = –.299, p = .05). That is, the more frequently religion was mentioned the more majority members shifted their attitudes toward the
position advocated by the minority member.
The correlation between attitude change and
the number of religious statements made during
discussion was not significant for majority
members exposed to a minority arguing in favor
of the death penalty (r(43) = .14).

Analysis of discussion content

Majority members’ thought listing

The audiotaped conversations were analyzed for
religious content by several coders working
independently (each conversation was analyzed
by two coders). Religious comments could be
pro-death penalty (e.g. the Bible says an eye for
an eye), against the death penalty (e.g. the Bible
says thou shalt not kill), or neutral regarding the
death penalty(e.g. I wish I could ask my Pastor
what he thinks about this issue). Discrepancies
in the coders’ original judgments were discussed
by them until consensus was reached (correlations for each pair of coders ranged from .74 to
.91, all values significant at p < .01). The total
number of religious statements made during
discussion were submitted to a 2 (minority in
favor of/against the death penalty)  2 (consensus/nonconsensus seeking group) analysis
of variance. There was a marginal main effect
for minority influence type (F(1,33) = 3.79, p =
.06). Religion was mentioned more frequently
in groups where the minority was arguing in
favor of the Zeitgeist (M = 4.07) than in groups
where the minority was arguing against the Zeitgeist (M = 1.85). This difference makes sense
when one considers that the majority members,

The thought-listing data were also analyzed for
religious content by two independent coders.
The inter-observer reliability (percent agreement) across the entire data set was 97 percent.
These data allow us to gauge the extent to which
religion was on the minds of those who were
exposed to a minority source of influence
arguing against the death penalty. It is for this
reason that we compared the thought-listing
data of majority members who were exposed to
a minority arguing against the Zeitgeist to the
thought listing data of majority members in
favor of the death penalty who were not exposed
to social influence (i.e. the individual participants in our study). A one-way analysis of variance revealed that majority members who were
exposed to a minority source of influence
arguing against the death penalty Zeitgeist
generated more arguments that were religious
in nature (M = 0.80) than those who were not
exposed to minority influence (M = 0.42)
(F(1,101) = 6.17, p = .01). There were no differences in the number of religious statements in
favor of the death penalty listed by each group
of subjects (F(1,101) = .371, p = .54). That is,
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majority members in favor of the death penalty
exposed to a minority source arguing against the
Zeitgeist were no more likely to generate
religious thoughts supporting the death penalty
(M = 0.36) than those who were not exposed to
minority influence (M = 0.29). Majority
members exposed to minority influence were
significantly more likely to list thoughts against
the death penalty that were religious in nature
(M = 0.45)than those who were not exposed to
minority influence (M = 0.14) (F(1,101) = 7.96,
p = .01). Finally, consensus and nonconsensus
seeking group members who were exposed to
minorities arguing against the death penalty
were compared to no influence controls. There
were no differences between the three groups
with respect to the number of religious arguments in favor of the death penalty that were
listed (F(2,101) = 1.08, p = .34). There were significant differences between the three groups
with respect to the number of religious arguments against the death penalty listed (F(2,101)
= 4.95, p = .01). Post hoc analyses (Least Significant Difference) revealed that both consensus
and discussion conditions (M = 0.35 and M =
0.53, respectively) differed from the no influence condition (M = 0.14) (at p = .09 and p = .01
respectively) but did not differ significantly
from one another.

Perceptions of discussion quality
The majority members’ responses to the 10
questions pertaining to discussion quality were
factor analyzed using varimax rotation. Three
factors accounted for 59 percent of the variance
(see Table 3 for scale statistics and the appendix
for the specific items in each scale). The first
factor included items that seemed to measure
the extent to which the conversation was a pleasant experience, thus forming an ‘enjoyment’
scale. The second factor appeared to be related
to discussion ‘thoroughness’. The third factor
appeared to tap into how engaged the participant was in the group discussion, forming an
‘engagement’ scale.
Majority members’ scores on each of the
three scales were submitted to a 2 (minority in
favor of/against the death penalty)  2 (consensus/nonconsensus seeking group) analysis

of variance. The only significant effect was a twoway interaction between minority influence type
and consensus condition (F(1,113) = 8.623, p =
.004). Majority members in the consensus
seeking condition evaluated their discussions
more favorably when they were exposed to a
minority arguing against the Zeitgeist (M = 7.65)
than when they were exposed to a minority
arguing in favor of the Zeitgeist (M = 7.10). The
opposite was true of majority members in the
nonconsensus condition. Majority members
evaluated their discussions more favorably when
they were exposed to a minority arguing in favor
of the Zeitgeist (M = 7.70) than when the minority was arguing against the Zeitgeist (M = 6.54).
The analyses of the ‘thoroughness’ and
‘engagement’ scales revealed no significant
effects for minority influence exposure type or
consensus condition.

Perceptions of minority members
Majority members’ responses to the questions
designed to assess their perceptions of the
minority source of influence were factor analyzed using varimax rotation. When there were
two minority members within the group, the
average of the two minorities’ scores was used in
the analysis. Four factors accounted for 64
percent of the variance (see Table 3 for scale statistics and the appendix for specific scale items).
The first factor appeared to be related to the
extent to which the minority source of influence
was positively evaluated, forming a ‘positive
evaluation’ scale. The second factor appeared to
be related to the minority sources’ flexibility,
forming an ‘inflexibility’ scale. The third factor
appeared to be related to the minority source of
influence’s ‘participation’ rate. Finally, the
fourth factor appeared to be related to the
majority member’s perceptions of the minority’s
attempt to ‘influence’ them during discussion.
Majority members’ ratings of their respective
minority group members on each of the four
scales were submitted to a 2 (minority in
favor/against the death penalty)  2 (consensus/nonconsensus seeking group) analysis of
variance. Positive evaluation scores did not
differ as a function of the type of minority influence majority members were exposed to or as a
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Table 3. Discussion and minority source perception scales’ statistics and correlations with majority member
attitude change

Perceptions of
Discussion quality
Enjoyment
Thoroughness
Engagement
Minority source
Positive evaluation
Inflexibility
Participation
Influence

SCALE
—————————————
% of variance


Correlation between scale and
attitude change minority’s
death penalty position
—————————————————–
Against
In favor

31
15
13

.58
.87
.69

–.30*
.02
.03

–.14
–.12
–.09

33
16
8
7

.85
.61
.54
.48

–.21
–.19
–.07
–.09

–.19
.11
.05
–.20

* Significant at p < .05.

function of consensus condition. With respect to
the inflexibility scale, there were no effects for
the type of minority influence majority members
were exposed to, but there were marginally significant differences in the majority members’
perceptions of the minority’s inflexibility in the
two consensus conditions. Those who reached a
group decision (M = 5.78) perceived their fellow
minority members as being more inflexible than
those who simply held a group discussion (M =
5.15) (F(1,115) = 2.34, p = 12). Regarding majority members’ perceptions of minority members’
participation, there was a main effect for type of
minority influence (F(1,114) = 5.36, p = .02).
That is, minority members arguing against the
death penalty were perceived by majority
members to participate less (M = 5.18) than
minority members arguing in favor of the death
penalty (M = 6.00). There was also a main effect
for consensus condition (F(1, 114) = 4.07, p =
.046). Minorities were perceived to participate
at higher rates in consensus seeking conditions
(M = 5.75) than in nonconsensus seeking conditions (M = 5.24). Finally, there was a two-way
interaction between type of minority influence
and consensus condition (F(1,114) = 6.58,p =
.01). Minority members’ participation rates,
when they were arguing against the death
penalty, were perceived by the majority similarly

in both the consensus (M = 5.11) and nonconsensus (M = 5.26) conditions, whereas the
minority members who were arguing in favor of
the death penalty were perceived to participate
much more in the consensus condition (M =
6.49) than in the nonconsensus condition (M =
5.19). Influence scores differed as a function of
the type of minority influence majority members
were exposed to (F(1,114) = 4.08, p = .04).
Minority members arguing against the death
penalty were perceived by majority members as
more influential (M = 6.74) than minority
members arguing in favor of the death penalty
(M = 6.20). Influence scores did not differ as a
function of consensus condition. Finally, all discussion quality and perceptions of minority
source scales were correlated with attitude
change. These correlations are presented in
Table 3.

Discussion
The primar y purpose of this study was to
broaden our understanding of the Zeitgeist
effects found in the minority influence literature through the use of freely interacting groups
discussing the death penalty. Although past
research findings consistently support the
notion that minorities are at a distinct advantage
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when they argue in favor of the Zeitgeist (Clark
& Maass, 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Paicheler, 1976,
1977), our results are inconsistent with those
findings. In our study, within the consensus
seeking condition, minorities who argued
against the Zeitgeist were more influential than
those who argued in favor of capital punishment. Although attitude change data alone
cannot explain why minorities arguing against
the Zeitgeist were more influential than those
who argued in favor of the death penalty, our
data do challenge the generalizability of Clark’s
(1990) explanation for the consistent asymmetries found in the minority influence literature.
The work of both Mugny and Perez (1991)
and Tindale et al. (1996) suggests that when
minority sources of influence can link their
arguments to some shared superordinate belief
system that can be used to validate the minority
position they will be influential regardless of
whether they are arguing in favor of or against
the Zeitgeist. This work led us to predict that
minorities arguing against the death penalty
would be more influential than those arguing in
favor of capital punishment when those who
argued against the death penalty Zeitgeist
appealed to their fellow group members’ shared
belief in the Christian religion. We found a significant relationship between majority
members’ attitude change and the frequency
with which religion was mentioned during
group discussion in the conditions where the
minority was arguing against the death penalty
but not when they argued in favor of it. The
difference between the two influence conditions makes sense when the pool of religious
arguments regarding the death penalty is considered. In our sample, only one argument in
favor of the death penalty was mentioned (i.e.
the Bible says an eye for an eye) whereas there
were several different arguments suggesting that
the implementation of the death penalty was not
consonant with the teachings of the Bible (i.e.
thou shalt not kill, God should be the final judge
of our behavior, criminals will pay for their
actions in the afterworld, God can deliver far
more severe punishment than humans can, only
God can be just). In other words, once group
members decided that the issue could be con-

sidered on religious grounds, those who were
opposed to the death penalty had available to
them many more arguments that they could use
to support their position than did those arguing
in favor of capital punishment. It is important to
point out that, consistent with persuasive arguments theory (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978), had
the pool of religious arguments favoring the
death penalty been larger, minorities arguing
against the death penalty may not have been as
influential because their religious arguments
could have been more easily counterargued with
religion. For example, we would not predict that
minorities arguing against the abortion Zeitgeist
(which would be a pro-abortion position within
our undergraduate population) would enjoy the
same advantage as minorities arguing against
the death penalty Zeitgeist simply because many
religious arguments could be used against the
position they advocated. In other words, the
presence of a shared representation (religious
identity) coupled with a large argument pool
favoring the minority position allowed the
minority arguing against the Zeitgeist to exert
more influence than the minority arguing
against the Zeitgeist. The presence of a shared
representation may help to create a context
where certain types of arguments are perceived
as relevant to the issue at hand. That is, the
greater number of religious arguments against
the death penalty would have mattered less had
our participants not shared strong Christian
identities and had not chosen to consider the
religious implications of their beliefs regarding
capital punishment.
Majority members who were in favor of the
death penalty and who were exposed to a minority source of influence arguing against the death
penalty Zeitgeist were more likely to list religious
thoughts than those who were in favor of the
death penalty who were not exposed to minority
influence. Clearly, religious statements, especially religious arguments against the death
penalty were much more salient to those
exposed to minorities arguing against the death
penalty than those who were not exposed to
minority influence. These results are consistent
with our ‘shared religious beliefs’ explanation
for the attitude change data. That is, they
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suggest that the minority source of influence led
majority members to recognize the relevance of
religion to the death penalty issue and to consider the religious implications of the position
they held.
Although the reviewed literature did not allow
for firm a priori predictions regarding the
effects of reaching consensus on attitude
change to be made, we find the differences
between consensus seeking and discussion only
conditions to be particularly interesting.
Perhaps the need to reach consensus prompted
participants to search for and to ultimately find
some common ground on which the death
penalty could be discussed. In other words, the
participants may have concluded that they were
unlikely to reach a decision unless such
common ground was found. One finding seems
to be quite consonant with this interpretation.
Religion was mentioned more frequently in the
consensus seeking conditions than it was in the
discussion only conditions. This suggests that in
contexts where a collective decision was not
required, group members may not have felt
compelled to find a shared way of framing the
problem so that it could be discussed and agreement could be reached. The two-way interaction
between consensus condition and minority
influence type for the discussion enjoyment
scale also suggests that when common ground is
found, the experience of discussing the issue
becomes more enjoyable.
It is interesting to note that none of the
studies exploring Zeitgeist effects have required
groups of individuals to discuss an issue with the
goal of reaching a collective decision in mind.
Without consensus pressure, majority group
members may feel more comfortable dismissing
minority points of view. That is, an opinion
minority can impose her/his opinion upon the
group more easily in consensus seeking versus
discussion contexts (Miller & Anderson, 1979;
Miller et al., 1987). Consistent with this notion,
we found that minorities were perceived as
being more extreme and inflexible and were
thought to participate at higher rates in consensus seeking versus discussion contexts.
Future research could explore the extent to
which consensus pressure leads group members

to seek out common ground on which they can
discuss the issue at hand and the process by
which this common ground is found. It may be
that the impact of shared representations is
most pronounced in consensus seeking contexts. Our results are limited in the extent to
which they can offer unequivocal support for
the notion that consensus pressure prompts
group members to find a common frame of
reference or task relevant shared representation
to assist them in reaching agreement among
themselves. However, they do suggest that, at
least in some contexts, minorities arguing
against the Zeitgeist can be more influential
than those arguing in favor of it. They also
provide provisional support for the notion that
minorities arguing against the Zeitgeist are
especially influential when their arguments
appeal to a shared belief system within the
group.

Notes
1. These pilot data were collected in 1994. At that
time, roughly 70 percent of the subject pool at
Grand Valley State University were in favor of the
death penalty. Given that our data were collected
over a four year period, it seemed prudent to
assess whether or not the ‘Zeitgeist’ changed
within our student population during that time.
Data collected in 1995–6 from our first 30 groups
(first 150 participants) reveal that 71 percent of
the individuals were in favor of the death penalty.
Data collected in 1997–8 from our last 30 groups
show that 73 percent of the subjects were in favor
of the death penalty. Similarly, national opinion
polls taken between 1972 and 1996 show a steady
increase in the number of Americans in favor of
the death penalty with this pattern holding for
both males and females and both Blacks and
Whites (Davis & Smith, 1996). In 1995, three out
of four Americans were in favor of the use of
capital punishment in some contexts.
2. It is important to point out that these data were
collected within the context of a larger ongoing
study exploring minority influence. The larger
ongoing study was designed to explore the effects
of reaching consensus on minority influence
potency and the minority’s ability to inspire
divergent thinking. In our laboratory we collect
from groups even when their composition does
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not match our experimental design. It is for this
reason that after several years of data collection
we had approximately an equal number of groups
where minority members were arguing against
and in favor of the Zeitgeist. Given the
distribution of opinions regarding the death
penalty in the Grand Valley State University
subject pool, the majority of those who came to
our lab were in favor of the death penalty. Only 21
percent of the 75 five-person groups had
compositions where the true minority position
(being against the death penalty) was held by the
majority (at least three) of the group members.
The data from all 16 of these groups are reported
in this paper. The comparison groups (where the
actual minority opinion is held by the majority of
the group members) were randomly chosen from
the remaining 59 groups.
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Appendix
Items for Minority Source and Discussion Perception Scales
Discussion quality
Enjoyment
I enjoyed discussing the issue.
It was easy to defend my side of the issue.
I never felt uncomfortable during discussion.
Thoroughness
Our discussion was very thorough.
We really examined the issue.
Engagement
I was relieved when the discussion was over (reverse scored).
Time seemed to pass quickly during our discussion.
Minority source
Positive evaluation
Seemed intelligent.
Presented logical arguments about the issue.
Made our discussion more enjoyable.
Appears to be knowledgeable regarding the death penalty.
Made our discussion more stimulating.
Seems to be a very friendly person.
Inflexibility
Seemed very rigid in their death penalty opinion.
Seemed very extreme in their death penalty position.
Participation
Dominated the entire conversation.
Did not talk much at all (reverse scored).
Influence
Was very influential during discussion.
Is not the kind of person to go along just to fit in.
Was very fair during our discussion.
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